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The faults in the make-up of the book are conspicuous. The type is poor, the index quite inadequate, maps are missing, the chapter titles misleading, and the illustrations one might expect in a work of this kind, designed as it should be for the popular taste rather than the scientific, entirely lacking.

ARTHUR IRVING ANDREWS.

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German Social Democracy during the War. By EDWYN BEVAN.
(New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 1919. Pp. x, 280.)

Notwithstanding the apparent unanimity with which the Social Democrats in the Reichstag voted war credits and in other ways supported the imperial government in the early days of August, 1914, a rift within their ranks—which indeed existed from the first—gradually became a chasm, and in January, 1917, the party fell definitely into two entirely separate and sharply antagonistic bodies. The “Majority” members continued to support the government, some on the ground that the time had come for the party to change its principles and accept responsibilities in the state, others on the ground that the party’s principles were right but did not preclude participation in measures for the defense of the country in a nonaggressive war. The Independents, on the other hand, went into open opposition, some denying that the war was, on the German side, one of self-defense, others maintaining that no socialist could consistently have any share in furthering the war policy of a capitalistic state, even if the war be a defensive one.

Mr. Bevan, writing early in 1918, undertakes to trace the history of Social Democratic participation in and protest against the war, from the beginning to the accession of Count Hertling to the chancellorship in the autumn of 1917. He fully recognizes the limitations under which he, as a foreigner writing in a hostile country, works; he says that the finally satisfactory account will have to be written by some one who was “inside the movement.” Diligent and discriminating use of German books, pamphlets, and newspapers, has, however, made visible at least the broad outlines of Social Democratic history in the war period; and Mr. Bevan has put together the results of his researches in a book which is not only interesting but, for the time being at all events, decidedly useful.

The theme of the volume is the continuous growth of the anti-war minority in numbers and influence, and the treatment is mainly chronological. The various defenses offered by the majority elements for their course are clearly analyzed; the arguments and motives of the Independents are judiciously appraised; and two principal conclusions are arrived at: (1) that the differences of view were fundamental and that the reproaches which the majority direct against the Independents for disrupting the party, and the reproaches which the Independents direct against the authorities of the old party for insisting upon conformity of action within the party, are equally unreasonable; and (2) that the minority grew, "not because the German masses cared for 'self-determination of nationalities' or 'no annexations,' or any other ideal principle, but because the bereavements and material discomforts of the war made them want peace above everything else, and the policy of the minority leaders seemed to promise them peace most speedily."

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Alsace-Lorraine since 1870. By BARRY CERF, University of Wisconsin. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1919. Pp. 180.)

Not the least among the triumphs of the righteous cause which carried the Allies to victory was the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France. The captivity of this land which lies between the Rhine and the Moselle lasted almost fifty years. That the question of Alsace-Lorraine was one of the causes of the world war, or, as Mr. Barry Cerf states in the preface to his excellent volume, one of the most important obstacles to peace between France and Germany, every student of history will agree. The loss of the Reichsland, the Land of the Empire, is perhaps the severest blow Germany has received.

The incorporation of Alsace-Lorraine into France dates from 1552. At that time it was a "mosaic of principalities, bishoprics, free cities, republics, seignories, etc., which comprised the imperial possessions on the left bank of the Rhine." About that same date it was organized by French administration into two provinces. These had been for centuries the prey of every invader; they had been the battle ground of Europe. France promised protection, prosperity and happiness; and France kept her word until the deplorable tragedy of 1871. Alsace-